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THE  CARRANZA  DEBACLE 


Herbert  Ingram  Priestley 


The  initial  steps  in  the  movement  which  resulted  in  the 
flight  and  death  of  President  Carranza  of  Mexico  began  to 
be  chronicled  in  the  daily  press  dispatches  as  early  as  the 
end  of  last  March.  Weeks  before  that  time  some  of  the 
details  of  the  proposed  revolution  were  passed  about  by 
word  of  mouth  in  the  United  States,  the  contest  in  Sonora 
being  freely  predicted  along  the  lines  which  it  actually 
followed.  It  is  thus  evident  that  the  waning  power  of  the 
government  had  been  accurately  gauged  during  the  winter, 
while  Obregon  was  making  his  political  tour  of  the  Re- 
public. During  the  year  1919  the  power  of  the  Carranza 
regime  was  apparently  at  its  highest,  though  that  power 
was  never  complete  nor  supported  by  a  large  or  significant 
part  of  the  population.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Yenus- 
tiano  Carranza  was  recognized  as  de  facto  head  of  the  Re- 
public of  Mexico  in  October,  1915,  after  he  had  refused  to 
abide  by  promises  he  had  made  not  to  assume  the  presi- 
dency, and  had  quarreled  with  Francisco  Villa  and  others  of 
his  companions  in  arms  against  Huerta.  Recognition  was 
bestowed,  not  in  full  confidence,  but  in  the  belief  that 
Carranza  led  the  party  which  had  made  the  most  effective 
campaign  against  the  disorders  prevailing  and  which  was 
most  likely  to  effect  the  pacification  of  the  country. 


408510 


Adequate  justification  for  that  recognition  would  have 
developed  had  there  come  speedy  pacification  of  the  dis- 
turbed areas,  had  the  power  been  consolidated  on  a  civil 
instead  of  a  military  basis,  and  had  a  reasonable  if  not  a 
grateful  attitude  toward  the  United  States  been  shown. 
But  pacification  was  unduly  retarded  by  the  policy  of  the 
military  arm,  which  persisted  in  treating  banditry  and 
rebellion  as  opportunities  for  self-enrichment  not  to  be  too 
suddenly  ended.  Thus  the  military  arm,  largely  revolution- 
created  to  serve  as  the  bulwark  of  the  government,  which 
had  but  a  precarious  tenure  in  the  public  esteem,  became  the 
weakness  that  worked  the  downfall  of  the  chief  under  whose 
sign  manual  it  pillaged  the  country. 

This  military  situation  was  abundant  cause  for  non- 
fulfilment  of  many  of  the  promises  under  which  the  Car- 
ranza  revolution  was  waged.  There  were  many  contribut- 
ing causes  in  internal  affairs.  It  is  true  that  the  prograi 
of  the  revolution  was  more  than  amply  laid  down  in  th 
Constitution  of  1917,  but  the  Constitution  was  never  real] 
in  force  and  acceptance  within  the  controlled  area.  1\ 
Utopian  provisions  for  bettering  labor  conditions  were  nev 
enacted  into  law  or  generally  observed  under  decrees.  I^ 
emancipation  of  the  peon  class  was  nullified  by  the  coi 
dition  of  semi- warfare  which  pervaded  most  areas  outside- 
the  large  cities.  The  financial  condition  of  the  country  left  * 
much  to  be  desired,  although  commerce  was  growing, 
although  tax  receipts  were  higher  by  one  half  than  they  had 
been  in  the  heyday  of  the  Diaz  regime,  and  although  busi- 
ness was  conducted  almost  entirely  on  a  basis  of  metallic 
currency.  The  educational  system  had  been  left  in  the 
hands  of  the  states  and  municipalities,  even  in  the  Federal 
District,  and  only  in  a  few  places^ — notably  not  in  the 
capital — did  it  receive  adequate  financing  and  attention. 
Promised  improvements  in  the  operation  of  the  courts  still 
left  the  people  ''hungering  and  thirsting  for  justice";  the 
jails  have  been  continuously  crowded  with  untried  prison- 
ers.   The  legislative  branch  broke  with  the  President  in  so 


far  as  it  could.  It  refused  to  pass  the  legislation  recom- 
mended by  the  Executive,  and  withdrew  the  extraordinary 
war  powers  under  which  Carranza  had  been  exercising  dic- 
tatorial control.  The  City  of  Mexico,  given  rein  as  a  ''free 
municipality, ' '  one  of  the  shibboleths  of  the  revolution,  was  . 
remiss  in  police  regulations,  sanitation,  education,  admin- 
istration of  justice,  and  in  control  of  public  morals.  The 
President  had  violated  the  ballot,  imposing  his  own  candi- 
dates as  governors  in  numerous  states,  and  had  used  these 
gentlemen  to  further  his  design  to  seat  his  own  candidate 
as  his  successor,  had  arrested  the  partisans  of  Obregon,  and 
imprisoned,  upon  flimsy  charges,  the  members  of  Congress 
who  opposed  him. 

In  external  affairs  the  non-payment  of  the  interest  on 
the  national  debt,  and  the  observance  of  a  neutrality  in  the 
Great  War  w^hich  veiled  only  too  thinly  a  wish  for  German 
success  fathered  by  the  thought  that  a  European  friend 
might  rise  up  to  check  the  hegemony  of  the  United  States 
upon  the  American  continent,  combined  to  complicate  a 
difficult  situation.  Coupled  with  this  mistaken  foreign 
policy^jwere^the  effects  of  the  attempt  at  ''revindication ' ' 
of^the  rights  of  the  nation  to  the  subsoil  deposits  of  petro- 
leum. Itwould  be  bootless  to  discuss  herejhe  merits  of  the  ^^li 
oil  controver^y^Jhe  questionJ[s_open  .tQ_debate-as-t;o  whatp 
the  Jegal^  history  involved  may_actuallx_be.  But  the  con- 
flict grew  tense  when  revindication  attempted  to  affect 
retroactively  lands  held  by  foreigners  in  full  titular  owner- 
ship under  the  laws  of  the  Diaz  regime,  which  permitted 
private  ownership  of  subsoil  mineral  oil.  Possibly  the  new 
legislation  would  have  left  ow^ners  in  possession  and  per- 
mitted profitable  operation  of  oil  properties;  but  suspicion 
that  the  opposite  course  might  be  taken,  backed  by  Amer-  • 
ican  ideas  of  the  sanctity  of  contracts,  threw  the  oil  pro- 
ducers into  an  opposition  which  was  extremely  embarrass- 
ing to  the  government. 

Thus  in  both  internal  and  external  affairs  Carranza,  in- 
stead of  addressing  himself  to  righting  conditions  which 


menaced  the  life  of  the  body  politic,  undertook  to  revolu- 
tionize the  government  upon  a  socialistic  theory  while  a 
corrupt  military  oligarchy  and  a  none  too  honest  set  of 
civilian  officers  vitiated  whatever  there  was  good  in  the  ncAV 
plan  by  the  most  cynical  grafting. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  think,  however,  that  these  attitudes 
and  conditions  were  entirely  new,  or  entirely  chargeable  to 
Carranza.  Many  of  them  are  inveterate  evils  which  will 
not  disappear  suddenly  under  any  government.  There  had 
been  a  perceptible  improvement  in  some  of  them  during 
Carranza 's  incumbency,  and  those  who  hoped  for  and  be- 
lieved in  the  ultimate  development  of  ability  by  the  IMexican 
people  to  govern  themselves  felt  that  the  first  great  step  in 
improvement  would  come  from  the  demonstration  of 
stability  through  peaceable  transmission  of  the  presidential 
power.  That  was  the  one  great  hope  of  the  Carranza 
regime.  In  the  mind  of  the  President  the  essential  thing 
was  to  transmit  the  power  to  a  man  who  would  continue 
his  own  program.  He  made  the  fatal  mistake  of  quarrel- 
ing with  the  most  popular  man  of  his  own  party,  who  was 
ambitious  to  succeed  him,  and  who  had  a  stronger  influence 
over  the  military  than  did  the  President.  If  nothing  suc- 
ceeds like  success  nothing  fails  like  failure  to  recognize  the 
possibilities,  or  rather  the  probabilities,  of  a  situation. 
Upon  Carranza 's  power  to  transmit  the  presidency  to  a  suc- 
cessor who  could  command  the  confidence  of  the  faction  in 
control  depended  the  justification  of  his  program.  The 
debacle,  then,  was  caused  by  the  personal  attitude  of  the 
President  rather  than  by  the  many  contributory  influences 
which  made  his  tenure  so  precarious. 

The  political  campaigns  of  would-be  successors  have 
been  waged  for  a  year  and  a  half;  their  acerbity  has  con- 
tributed not  a  little  to  the  unrest  and  disorder  in  the 
country.  Early  in  January  of  the  present  year  the  well- 
known  fact  of  Obregon's  lead  in  the  race  was  reiterated  by 
Mr.  Gerald  Brandon  in  the  Los  Angeles  Times  in  sub- 
stantially the  following  words:  "Obregon  is  the  only  man 


who  has  defeated  Villa.  He  is  a  radical,  and  has  fathered 
several  startling  attempts  to  amend  the  present  Constitu- 
tion, thereby  earning  the  enmity  of  Carranza.  He  has 
practically  admitted  that  he  will  start  a  revolution  if  there 
is  not  a  fair  election.  If  he  does  so  he  will  win,  as  the 
majority  of  the  military  are  for  him." 

About  the  same  time  it  began  to  be  announced  that 
Ambassador  Ignacio  Bonillas  would  presently  return  from 
the  United  States  to  Mexico  to  quicken  his  candidacy, 
which  had  the  backing  of  the  President,  and  which  had  been 
talked  of  for  six  months  at  least.  Almost  simultaneously 
General  Pablo  Gonzalez  surrendered  his  command  in  the 
south  to  begin  his  formal  campaign,  which  had  been  thought 
to  have  Carranza 's  support  before  Bonillas  was  brought 
forward  as  a  civilian  candidate  who  would  free  Mexico  from 
her  ''plague  of  military  men." 

Late  in  January  press  dispatches  said  that  a  force  of 
picked  military  police  had  been  sent  to  Mazatlan  and  Her- 
mosillo  in  Sonora  to  fight  Yaqui  supporters  of  Obregon, 
who  controlled  that  state  politically.  These  traditional 
enemies  of  whatever  central  government  may  exist  had  been 
on  the  warpath  several  months.  Obregon  was  at  the  time 
in  Guanajuato,  and  his  interests  were  being  advanced  in  the 
United  States  by  General  Salvador  Alvarado  of  Yucatecan 
fame,  who  had  been  recently  arrested  for  fomenting  social 
revolution,  but  who  had  escaped.  On  February  11  an 
assembly  of  governors  in  the  capital,  called  by  Carranza, 
issued  a  declaration  that  the  coming  elections  would  be  held 
peaceably  and  honestly,  they  themselves  vouching  mainten- 
ance of  law  and  order.  Pablo  Gonzalez  issued  a  manifesto 
advocating  friendly  relations  with  foreign  powers,  abolition 
of  the  military  caste,  and  liberal  amnesty  laws.  Carranza 
again  reiterated  his  declaration  that  he  would  not  hold  the 
presidency  after  expiration  of  his  term,  and  that  if  no 
executive  were  elected  Congress  would  name  one.  The 
Bonillas  candidacj^  began  to  develop  active  character. 


8 


While  all  these  discordant  appeals  were  being  made  to 
the  small  political  element,  the  country  continued  in  serious 
disorder,  evinced  by  murder  of  several  Americans  and 
others.  In  the  midst  of  such  conditions  it  was  announced 
that  the  American  State  and  War  Departments  were  keenly 
interested  in  a  report  of  the  arrival  at  Agua  Prieta,  in 
Sonora,  of  a  large  force  of  troops  presumably  sent  to  pre- 
vent the  armed  forces  of  the  State  from  supporting 
Obregon.  These  State  forces  were  under  Adolfo  de  la 
Huerta,  the  governor,  who  is  a  young  man  of  radical  ten- 
dencies, a  follower  of  Obregon,  and  now  Substitute  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic. 

At  this  juncture,  de  la  Huerta  announced  that  a  strike 
was  threatened  by  the  employees  of  the  Southern  Pacific 
de  Mexico.  This  had  been  predicted  a  full  month  before. 
While  Bonillas  was  being  given  an  apparently  enthusiastic 
welcome  in  Mexico  City  on  March  22,  Obregon  and  Gon- 
zalez began  to  try  to  harmonize  their  bitter  antagonisms  in 
order  to  oppose  him.  Obregon  had  need  of  the  alliance. 
By  the  end  of  the  month  General  Dieguez  stood  ready  to 
invade  Sonora  to  seat  a  new  civil  governor,  C.  G.  Soriano. 
The  Obregon  soldiery  was  preparing  to  repel  the  invasion, 
as  the  Sonora  group  had  no  will  to  see  their  government 
taken  from  them  in  the  way  Carranza  had  taken  possession 
of  the  states  of  San  Luis  Potosi,  Guanajuato,  Queretaro, 
Campeche,  Nuevo  Leon,  Tamaulipas,  Jalisco,  and  Vera 
Cruz. 

On  April  3  the  railway  strike  began.  Carranza  threat- 
ened to  operate  the  road  with  soldiers.  This  was  the  signal 
for  the  officials  of  Sonora  to  begin  revolution.  On  the  ninth 
they  anticipated  Carranza  by  seizing  the  railway  and  operat- 
ing it  with  strikers,  whose  terms  were  conceded.  The  State 
officers  next  seized  the  customhouse  and  post  office  at  Agua 
Prieta  and  garrisoned  the  town.  The  legislature  in  an  all- 
night  session  voted  to  secede  and  to  constitute  the  ''Re- 
public of  Sonora"  an  independent  entity  until  they  were 
assured  that  the  rights  of  the  State  would  not  be  infringed. 


9 


At  the  moment  of  the  uprising  Obregon  was  under 
technical  arrest  in  Mexico  City  charged  with  complicity  in 
revolutionary  plans  being  fomented  by  one  Robert  Cejudo. 
The  military  operations  of  the  new  Republic  were  placed  in 
charge  of  General  Plutarco  Elias  Calles,  who  had  recently 
resigned  from  the  national  cabinet  to  enter  the  campaign 
for  Obregon.  His  immediate  task  was  to  repel  invasion  by 
Dieguez,  who  was  expected  to  advance  from  Chihuahua  by 
way  of  Pulpito  Pass.  But  the  Chihuahua  forces,  after 
having  been  denied  railway  transportation  from  El  Paso  to 
Douglas,  refused  to  advance.  The  attempt  of  Carranza  to 
deal  with  the  revolution  from  the  eastern  side  was  thus 
rendered  futile. 

In  the  meantime  Governor  Iturbe  to  the  south  in  Sinaloa 
announced  that  he  was  "still  loyal" — he  should  have  been, 
for  he  had  become  a  multimillionaire  by  virtue  of  his  gov- 
ernorship— but  neutral  between  Mexico  and  Sonora.  He 
was  looking  for  a  safe  place  to  fall.  The  troops  of  Sonora 
now  began  to  advance  upon  the  Sinaloa  border  in  order  to 
bring  that  State  into  open  revolt  and  control  the  coast. 
They  ''took"  Culiacan  on  April  17  and  pressed  on  to 
Mazatlan  and  Tepic.  By  April  15  Obregon  had  escaped 
from  the  capital  in  disguise  with  General  Benjamin  Hill 
and  had  made  his  way  to  the  southwest.  He  was  said  to 
have  established  wireless  communication  whereby  to  direct 
the  revolution.  On  April  18  the  State  of  Nayarit  indorsed 
the  Sonora  movement;  all  the  interior  towns  of  Sonora 
adhered  to  the  cuartelazo  of  Agua  Prieta,  and  practically 
all  the  Yaqui  and  the  Mayo  Indians  of  the  regions  did  so 
as  well.  Michoacan  to  the  south  soon  joined  in  defection; 
in  Chihuahua  numerous  army,  officers  cast  their  contem- 
plated lot  with  the  rapidly  growing  movement  to  change 
the  national  leader.  On  April  21  Benjamin  Hill,  the 
''original  Obregonista, "  was  said  to  have  advanced  to  Con- 
treras,  on  the  outskirts  of  the  capital,  with  troops  from 
Guerrero.  Zacatecas  was  confessedly  in  rebel  hands. 
Tuxpam    in    the    oil    regions    was   threatened,    troops    at 


10 


Linares  revolted,  and  Mexico  City  was  cut  off  from  com- 
munication. 

The  Liberal  Constitutionalist  Party  thereupon  made  a 
demand  that  Carranza  should  relinquish  his  office,  and, 
under  declarations  contained  in  the  ' '  Plan  de  Agua  Prieta, ' ' 
set  up  Adolfo  de  la  Huerta  as  supreme  commander  until 
such  time  as  the  states  joining  Sonora  should  make  a  choice. 
A  provisional  president  was  to  be  named  as  soon  as  the  Plan 
should  be  adopted  by  the  Liberal .  Constitutionalist  Army. 
The  Plan  announced  a  policy  of  protection  to  all  citizens 
and  foreigners  and  the  enforcement  of  all  their  legal  rights. 
Especially  was  emphasized  a  determination  to  develop  in- 
dustries, commerce,  and  business  in  general.  Finally,  the 
antiphonal  strophe  habitual  in  the  IMexican  system  of  gov- 
ernment by  cuartelazo  was  added:  ''Effectual  suffrage,  no 
re-election." 

The  legal  government  continued  to  camouflage  the  situ- 
ation by  absurd  claims  of  strength,  but  its  position  was 
serious.  The  effort  to  send  troops  into  the  north  failed,  and 
Governor  Iturbe  of  Sinaloa  threatened  to  evacuate  that 
State  and  Nayarit  unless  he  could  be  reinforced.  Obregon 
was  nearly  ready  to  advance  from  Guerrero  to  the  capital ; 
more  than  50,000  troops  had  joined  the  prospering  cause. 

On  the  last  day  of  the  month  Washington  received  dis- 
patches sajdng  that  Carranza  was  planning  to  leave  the 
capital,  but  at  the  same  time  it  was  known  that  Pablo 
Gonzalez  had  cut  rail  communication  with  Vera  Cruz.  He 
had  recently  been  obliged  by  Carfanza  to  withdraw  his 
candidacy  in  order  to  compel  Obregon  to  follow  suit,  it  was 
claimed.  This  may  have  influenced  Gonzalez  to  assist  the 
cuartelazo.  He  had  left  Mexico  City  on  a  feigned  errand, 
and,  once  safely  outside,  had  revolted  with  numerous  sub- 
ordinates on  May  3.  A  rumor  spread  that  Carranza 's 
remaining  generals,  summoned  to  advise  him,  had  recom- 
mended that  he  resign  not  later  than  May  15.  The  enemy 
now  numbered  twice  the  total  of  the  government  forces. 

On  May  5  President  Carranza  issued  his  last  manifesto. 
He  declared  that  he  would  fight  to  the  finish,  that  he  would 


11 


not  resign,  nor  turn  the  power  over  to  anyone  not  his  duly 
elected  successor ;  he  said : 

I  must  declare  that  I  consider  it  one  of  the  highest  duties  which 
devolve  upon  me  to  set  down  affirmed  and  established  the  principle 
that  in  future  the  public  power  shall  not  be  the  prize  of  military 
chiefs  whose  revolutionary  merits,  however  great,  may  serve  to 
excuse  future  acts  of  ambition.  I  consider  that  it  is  essential  for 
the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  Mexico  that  the  transmission 
of  power  shall  always  be  effected  peacefully  and  by  democratic 
procedure,  that  the  cuartelazo  as  a  means  of  ascent  to  power  shall 
forever  be  abolished  entirely  from  our  political  practices.  And  I 
consider,  finally,  that  the  principle  must  be  kept  inviolate  which 
was  adopted  by  the  Constitution  of  1917,  that  no  man  shall  rule 
over  the  destinies  of  the  nation  who  has  tried  to  climb  to  power 
by  means  of  insubordination,  the  cuartelazo,  or  treason. 

"While  this  declaration  was  being  penned,  and  was  being 
given  to  the  press  by  Luis  Cabrera,  the  man  who  above  all 
others  is  responsible  for  the  unpopularity  and  the  mistaken 
attitudes  of  Carranza,  the  exodus  had  been  planned,  and 
was  immediately  put  into  execution. 

It  was  an  exodus,  not  a  flight.  Professor  J.  H.  Smith 
has  said  of  the  departure  of  President  Herrera  from  Mexico 
during  the  stormy  days  of  the  Mexican  War,  that  he  "left 
the  palace  Avith  the  entire  body  of  his  loyal  officers  and 
officials,  his  mild  face  and  his  respectable  side-whiskers — in 
one  hired  cab."  Had  Carranza  limited  his  contingent  to 
those  who  were  genuinely  loyal  a  cab  might  have  sufficed. 
The  proposal  was  to  transfer  the  government  to  Vera  Cruz, 
whence  so  many  hard-pressed  forlorn  hopes  have  been  able 
to  ' '  come  back. ' '  Twenty-one  trains,  collected  and  equipped 
at  great  effort,  were  to  carry  away  20,000  troops,  carloads  of 
records,  and  millions  of  treasure.  The  dispatches  said 
27,000,000  pesos  were  taken,  but,  after  the  disaster,  Pastor 
Rouaix,  ex-secretary  of  agriculture,  upon  returning  to 
Mexico  on  May  18  with  the  booty,  said  that  it  was  worth 
100,000,000  pesos.  In  addition  to  the  troops,  there  was  a 
carload  of  employees  of  state,  the  Cabinet,  the  Supreme 
Court,  and  the  Permanent  Commission  of  Congress. 


12 


Misfortune  attended  every  step.  There  was  delay  and 
confusion  in  getting  off.  Attacks  on  the  convoy  began 
almost  at  once.  Before  they  passed  La  Villa  the  last 
four  trains  were  cut  off.  Tools  for  tearing  up  the  track  in 
the  rear  had  been  left  behind  during  the  first  attack,  and 
a  wild  engine,  driven  against  the  fugitives'  last  train, 
wrecked  artillery  and  aviation  equipment,  and  killed  or 
wounded  railway  employees.  After  delay  at  Apizaco  on 
May  8  and  9,  the  loyal  forces  went  on  to  San  Marcos. 
Beyond  that  place  they  engaged  revolutionary  troops,  tak- 
ing four  hundred  prisoners.  On  May  12  they  reached 
Rinconada,  where  they  learned  that  General  Guadalupe 
Sanchez  had  gone  over  to  Obregon,  deserting  General 
Candido  Aguilar,  the  President's  son-in-law,  and  that  there 
was  no  longer  hope  of  a  stand  at  Orizaba,  where  Aguilar 
was  to  hold  the  ways,  for  he,  deserted,  had  fled. 

Finally,  after  his  trains  were  useless,  and  his  forces  had 
been  defeated  at  Aljibes,  Carranza,  maintaining  imperturb- 
able sangfroid,  gave  up  hope  of  escape  by  rail  and  set  out 
for  the  Puebla  mountains,  trusting  perhaps  in  the  aid  of  the 
Cabrera  family,  which  was  strong  in  the  region. 

"While  making  his  way  northeastward,  presumably  to- 
ward some  small  gulf  port,  he  w^as  betrayed  by  one  Herrero, 
a  "general  de  dedo"  of  sufficient  obscurity  to  suggest  that 
he  might  have  been  someone's  agent.  The  President  was 
done  -to  death  while  he  slept  with  his  dwindled  retinue  in 
a  mountain  shack  at  Tlaxcalantongo,  in  the  State  of  Puebla. 
—  Thus  far  bloodshed  had  been  insignificant.  Obregon, 
who  had  entered  the  City  of  Mexico  unresisted  on  May  8, 
had  sent  flying  columns  to  capture  Carranza,  issuing  re- 
peated orders  that  he  was  not  to  be  injured,  and  endeavor- 
ing to  induce  him  to  surrender  upon  reiterated  assurances 
of  personal  guaranties.  All  overtures  had  been  spurned. 
It  was  evidently  the  intention  to  spare  his  life.  The  con- 
siderations of  humanity,  of  old  associations,  even  of  recog- 
nition itself,  demanded  this.  The  pig-headed  country  gentle- 
man, who  was  unsuccessful  at  managing  the  mature  men  of 


13 


his  organization,  knew  how  to  play  his  last  card  so  as  to 
diminish  his  opponents'  profit  to  the  minimum.  Obregon's 
tart  reply  to  the  telegram  sent  by  some  thirty  followers  of 
Carranza  announcing  the  final  disaster,  was  evidently  ad- 
dressed as  much  to  the  public  of  Mexico  and  of  the  United 
States  as  to  the  remnant  of  the  lost  cause.  The  revolu- 
tionary party  has  taken  energetic  means  to  demonstrate  its 
non-complicity  in  the  deed. 

Most  of  the  official  family  which  remained  with  the 
Primer  Jefe  to  the  end  were  imprisoned  for  a  time  in 
Mexico  City,  but  nearly  all  have  now  been  released.  Gen- 
eral Juan  Barragan,  the  youngster  under  thirty  who  was 
the  military  genius  of  the  last  regime,  escaped,  and  fled 
across  the  border. 

The  body  of  Carranza  was  brought  back  to  Mexico  City 
on  May  24  after  an  investigation,  partly  financed  by 
Obregon  personally,  which  disproved  the  claim  of  Herrero 
that  the  President  had  committed  suicide.  He  was  buried 
in  the  cemetery  of  Dolores,  according  to  his  known  desire. 
Mexico  gave  itself  up  to  uniform  manifestations  of  regret 
and  respect.  It  was  anticipated  for  a  time  that  the  revul- 
sion of  feeling  would  develop  into  armed  opposition  to  the 
revolution ;  there  have  been  armed  clashes  in  the  north,  and 
a  rebel  named  Osuna  is  still  in  the  field,  but  his  forces  are 
small  and  he  has  already  met  some  defeats.  None  of  the 
rebel  activity  has  the  purpose  of  vindicating  Carranza. 

On  May  25  Adolfo  de  la  Huerta  was  made  Substitute 
President  by  the  reassembled  Congress.  He  is  to  serve  the 
unexpired  term  of  Carranza,  that  is,  until  the  end  of  Decem- 
ber. He  is  one  of  the  young  men  of  the  north,  an  active 
revolutionist  for  years.  He  has  been  a  decided  radical, 
interesting  himself  in  labor  legislation,  and  has  announced 
his  interest  in  the  proletariat  even  since  his  raise  to  the 
presidency.  His  friends  say  that  his  ideas  have  been  tem- 
pered by  the  acquisition  of  power,  and  that  he  has  re- 
nounced his  inveterate  animosity  toward  capital.  He  has 
recently  been  a  devoted  follower  of  Obregon,  who  is  said 


14 


to  be  ''obeying"  the  new  regime  from  private  offices  in 
Mexico  City.  Several  members  of  the  new  cabinet  are 
fairly  well  known  to  the  American  public.  The  Minister 
of  War  is  General  Plutarco  Elias  Calles,  who  was  for  a 
time  in  Carranza's  cabinet  as  Secretary  of  Commerce  and 
Industry;  the  latter  position  is  now  held  by  Alberto  Pani. 
The  treasury  has  been  intermittently  in  charge  of  General 
Salvador  Alvarado,  whose  career  in  Yucatan  as  an  inde- 
pendent Socialist  governor,  and  later  as  an  opponent  of 
Carranza  and  supporter  of  Obregon,  has  made  him  well 
known.  It  is  said  that  his  connection  with  the  Obregon 
government  will  be  transitory.  That  may  well  be,  for  he 
is  an  individualist  like  Obregon;  but  he  may  not  willingly 
subside.  The  ministry  of  Communications  and  Public 
Works  has  been  entrusted  to  General  Ortiz  Rubio,  that  of 
Agriculture  and  Fomento  to  General  Enrique  Estrada, 
while  the  name  of  General  Jacinto  B.  Trevino  has  been  con- 
nected with  various  cabinet  positions,  as  have  those  of 
Antonio  Villareal,  Morales  Hesse,  Santiago  Martinez 
Alomia,  and  others.  Foreign  relations  have  been  committed 
to  Miguel  Covarrubias,  who  has  had  a  diplomatic  career 
of  some  forty  years.  Representation  of  the  new  government 
at  Washington  is  in  the  hands  of  Fernando  Iglesias  Cal- 
deron.  Felix  F.  Palavicini,  old  war  horse  of  the  early 
revolution,  editor  of  El  Universal,  a  strong  aliadofilo  during 
the  Great  War,  and  capable  publicist  who  habitually  finds 
himself  on  the  winning  side  of  affairs,  has  been  given  a 
mission  before  numerous  courts  of  the  Old  World.  The 
legations  at  Madrid  and  Mexico  have  been  raised  to  the  rank 
of  embassies,  and  the  choice  of  ministers  is  now  being  made. 
The  new  rector  of  the  University  of  Mexico  is  Lie.  Jose 
Vazconcelos,  well-known  educator  and  litterateur.  It  seems 
likely  that  the-  educational  system  will  become  organized 
under  federal  control,  which  will  place  it  in  better  position 
than- it  ever  has  been.  Effort  is  being  made  to  obtain  a  small 
number  of  American  teachers. 


15 


Public  opinion  in  Mexico  has  received  the  new  order 
with  optimism.  Among  Americans  it  is  looked  upon  as  a 
reorganization  of  the  power  within  the  group  which  Car- 
ranza  himself  led,  but  the  sentiment  is  frequently  voiced 
that  ' '  anything  is  better  than  Carranza. ' '  The  change  will 
develop  rather  in  personal  attitudes  than  in  declared  prin- 
ciples of  government.  The  men  who  lead  the  new  move- 
ment have  been  known  by  word  and  deed  as  pronounced 
radicals.  The  swing  of  the  pendulum  has  been  steadily 
toward  more  radical  idealism  ever  since  Independence.  It 
has  been  noticeable,  however,  that  in  all  cases  of  actual 
acquisition  of  power  radicalism  has  been  left  in  the  stage  of 
theory,  and  pronounced  materialistic  conservatism,  for  the 
benefit  of  those  who  govern,  has  usually  eventuated. 

In  the  United  States  the  Obregon  movement  has  been 
received  with  favorable  comment  in  circles  in  which  Mex- 
ican business  interests  are  important.  The  leading  article 
in  the  May  number  of  The  Americas,  published  by  the 
National  City  Bank  of  New  York,  says  in  part : 

Now  that  events  in  Mexico  are  moving  toward  final  settlement, 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  plans  repeatedly  made 
and  postponed  may  be  put  into  execution,  and  trade  relations  estab- 
lished between  the  business  men  of  this  country  and  the  merchants 
of  Mexico  that  will  be  permanent  and  profitable  to  both  groups. 
...  In  spite  of  troubles  that  may  come  during  the  next  few  months 
and  outward  appearances  that  make  it  appear  that  Mexico  is  merely 
keeping  up  its  favorite  pastime  of  revolution  and  civil  war,  there 
is  sound  reason  for  believing  that  constructive  influences  are  at 
work  and  that  a  happier  and  more  prosperous  epoch  is  nearly  at 
hand. 

It  would  be  futile  to  expect  that  mere  change  of  leader- 
ship from  one  coterie  to  another  within  a  small  fraction  of 
the  politically  significant  element  of  the  population  will 
work  an  immediate  miracle.  There  is  still  a  period  of 
anxiety  to  pass  through.  The  congressional  elections  have 
been  set  for  the  first  Sunday  in  August,  and  the  presidential 
election  for  September.  Most  of  the  governors  have  been 
changed  and  the  municipalities   reorganized,   with   Obre- 


16 


gonistas  in  place,  hence  the  machinery  is  well  arranged  for 
peaceable  elections.  Obregon  is  given  a  fair  field  by  the 
definite  renunciation  of  Gonzalez.  If  the  old  conservative 
element  put  forward  a  candidate,  the  action  will  be  merely 
nominal,  though  the  problem  of  Villa  and  his  old  defenders 
of  the  Constitution  of  1857  still  continues  to  perplex  the 
new  government. 

The  entire  situation  cannot  be  predicated  on  the  per- 
sonality of  Obregon,  however.  The  new  Congress  will  be 
potent  in  capacity  to  promote  discord,  as  was  the  old.  The 
new  official  class  as  a  whole  is  new  and  untried.  When 
such  difficult  problems  as  the  oil  controversy  come  before 
Congress  there  will  be  great  divergence  of  opinion.  The 
oil  men  have  asked  to  have  the  Carranza  decrees  annulled 
and  the  program  of  legislation  definitely  settled.  Among 
the  Mexicans  there  is  no  unanimity  concerning  annulment 
of  the  decrees  or  solutions  of  numerous  problems  raised  by 
Article  27  of  the  Constitution.  President  Huerta's  recent 
favorable  decrees  are  of  course  only  temporary  in  their 
effect. 

There  is  a  general  disposition  on  the  part  of  many  foreign 
powers  to  consider  the  new  provisional  government  as  the 
legal  successor  of  the  old  one,  and  the  question  of  recog- 
nition is  assumedly  not  to  be  raised,  at  least  as  far  as  actual 
practice  is  concerned.  The  Mexican  papers  express  con- 
fidence that  the  United  States  will  announce  recognition  at 
an  early  date.  They  indicate  surprise  at  the  proposals  con- 
tained in  the  report  of  Senator  Fall's  committee,  and  it  is 
not  to  be  expected  that  acquiescence  in  all  the  provisions  of 
that  report  would  be  forthcoming  without  irritation. 

Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  solution  of 
the  international  problem  lies  not  alone  in  readjustment 
of  material  contracts.  Prosperity,  successful  commerce, 
increased  wages,  elevated  standards  of  living,  all  proved 
ineffectual  to  satisfy  a  newly  developed  industrial  middle 
class  which  rose  during  the  Diaz  regime.  The  magical  pros- 
perity of  the  past  year  has  not  made  the  nation  peaceful 


•«*•*•••••<    •♦••  ••  •••  • 

17 

or  happy,  for  below  the  prosperous  classes  exists  the  mass 
of  the  Indian  population,  untouched  by  the  wave  of  political 
change  that  has  gone  over  its  head,  unhelped  by  promises 
unkept,  uninterested  in  its  own  elevation.  If  genuine 
peace  has  come,  if  material  prosperity  is  assured,  now  must 
begin  a  long  earnest  effort  for  the  establishment  of  justice 
and  for  the  development  of  an  adequate  system  of  moral 
and  social  education,  an  effort  which  may  result  in  the 
amalgamation  of  the  peoples  of  Mexico  into  a  national  unity. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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